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Abstract. We study quantum period finding algorithms such as Simon, Shor, and Eker˚a-H˚astad. For
a periodic function f these algorithms produce – via some quantum embedding of f – a quantum
superposition
∑
x |x〉 |f(x)〉, which requires a certain amount of output bits that represent |f(x)〉. We
show that we can lower this amount to a single output qubit by hashing f down to a single bit.
Namely, we replace the embedding of f in quantum period finding circuits by several embeddings of
hashed versions of f . We show that on expectation this modification only doubles the required amount
of quantum measurements, while significantly reducing the total number of qubits. For example, for
Simon’s period finding algorithm in some n-bit function f : Fn2 → Fn2 our hashing technique reduces
the required qubits from 2n down to n + 1. For the Eker˚a-H˚astad algorithm for factoring n-bit RSA
our hashing reduces the required qubits from ( 3
2
+ o(1))n down to ( 1
2
+ o(1))n.
Keywords: Quantum Period Finding, Simon, Shor, Eker˚a-H˚astad, Minimizing Qubits
1 Introduction
Although there is steady progress in constructing larger quantum computers, within the next years
the number of quantum bits seems to be too limited for tackling problems of interesting size, e.g.
for period finding applications in cryptography [8,7,9,14,12,6,13]
Shor’s algorithm [16] for polynomial time factorization of n-bit numbers computes a superpo-
sition
∑
x |x〉 |f(x)〉 with 2n input qubits representing the input |x〉 to f (sometimes also called
control qubits) and n output qubits representing the output |f(x)〉 of the function (sometimes also
called arithmetic qubits).
However, it may not be necessary to implement a full-fledged 3n-qubit Shor algorithm in order
to factor numbers or compute discrete logarithms. Quantum computers with a very limited number
of qubits might still serve as a powerful oracle that assists us in speeding up classical computations.
For instance, Bernstein, Biasse and Mosca [2] developed an algorithm that factors n-bit numbers
with the help of only a sublinear amount of n
2
3 qubits in subexponential time that is (slightly)
faster than the currently best known purely classical factorization algorithm.
Several other algorithms saved on the number of qubits in Shor’s algorithm by shifting some
more work into a classical post-processing, while – in contrast to [2] – still preserving polynomial
run time. Interestingly, all these algorithms concentrate on reducing the input qubits, while keep-
ing n output qubits. Seifert [15] showed that – using for the classical post-process simultaneous
Diophantine approximations instead of continued fractions – the number of input qubits can be
reduced from 2n to (1+o(1))n. For n-bit RSA numbers, which are a product of two n/2-bit primes,
Eker˚a and H˚astad [5] reduced the number of input qubits down to (12 + o(1))n, using some variant
of the Hidden Number Problem [3] in the post-process . Thus, the Eker˚a-H˚astad version of Shor’s
algorithm factors n-bit RSA with a total of (32 + o(1))n qubits.
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Mosca and Ekert [11] showed that in principle one can reduce the number of input qubits even
down to a single one, at the cost of an increased depth of Shor’s quantum circuit. However, we
currently do not see how to combine the Mosca-Ekert algorithm with our new hashing technique.
Our contribution. We hash f(x) in the output qubits down to a single qubit. This can be realized
using quantum embeddings of h ◦ f for different hash functions h. Our basic observation is that
hashing preserves the periodicity of f . Namely, if f(x) = f(x+ s) for some period s and all inputs
x then also
h(f(x)) = h(f(x+ s)) for the period s and all inputs x.
The drawback of hashing is of course that h introduces many more undesirable collisions
h(f(x)) = h(f(x′)) where x, x′ are not a multiple of s apart. Surprisingly, even for 1-bit range
hash functions this plethora of undesirable collisions does not at all affect the correctness of our
quantum period finding algorithms, and only insignificantly increases their runtimes.
More precisely, concerning correctness we show that a replacement of f by some hashed version
of f has the following effects.
Simon’s algorithm: In the input qubits, we still measure only vectors y that are orthogonal to
the period s. The amplitudes of all other inputs cancel out.
Shor’s algorithm: Let the period be d = 2r, and let us use q > r input qubits. Then we still
measure in the input qubits only numbers y that are multiples 2q−r. The amplitudes of all other
inputs cancel out. In the case of general (not only power of two) periods and in Eker˚a-H˚astad’s
algorithm we measure all inputs y 6= 0 with exactly half the probability as without hashing.
Our correctness property immediately implies that the original post-processing in Simon’s al-
gorithm (Gaussian elimination) and in Shor’s algorithm (e.g. continued fractions) can still be used
in the hashed version of the algorithms for period recovery.
However, this does not imply that we achieve similar runtimes. Namely, in the original algorithms
of Simon and Shor we measure all y having a non-zero amplitude with a uniform probability
distribution. In Simon’s algorithm for some period s ∈ Fn2 we obtain each of the 2n−1 many y ∈ Fn2
orthogonal to s with probability 1
2n−1 . In Shor’s algorithm with period d = 2
r, we measure each of
the d many possible multiples y of 2q−r with probability 1d .
These uniform probability distributions are destroyed by moving to the hashed version of the
algorithms. Since h(f(x)) = h(f(x′)) for x 6= x′ happens for universal 1-bit range hash functions
with probability 12 , the undesirable collisions put a probability weight of (roughly)
1
2 on measuring
y 6= 0 in the input qubits.
This seems to be bad news, since neither in Simon’s algorithm does the zero vector y provide
information about s, nor does in Shor’s algorithmus the zero-multiple y of 2q−r provide information
about d. However as good news, we show that besides putting probability weight 12 on y = 0,
hashing does not destroy the probability distribution stemming from the amplitudes of quantum
period finding algorithms. Namely, we show that for the whole class of quantum period finding
circuits that we consider – including Simon, Shor and Eker˚a-H˚astad – the following result holds. If
the probability to measure y is p(y) when using f , then we obtain probability p(y)/2 (taken over
the random choice of h from a family of universal hash functions) to measure y when using h ◦ f .
Put differently, if we condition on the event that we do not measure y = 0 in the input bits
(which happens in roughly every second measurement) in both cases – using f itself or its hashed
version h ◦ f – we obtain exactly the same probability distribution for the measurements of any
y 6= 0. This implies that our hashing approach preserves not only the correctness but also the
2
runtime analysis of any processing of the measured data in a classical post-process. Thus, at the
cost of only twice as many quantum measurements we save all but one of the output qubits.
In particular, we show that the original Simon algorithm [18] — that recovers for a periodic
function f : Fn2 → Fn2 its period in time polynomial in n with expected n + 1 measurements using
2n qubits — admits a hashed version with expected 2(n+1) measurements using only n+1 qubits.
The original Eker˚a-H˚astad version of Shor’s algorithm that computes discrete logarithms d in
some abelian group G in polynomial time using (1 + o(1)) log d + log(|G|) qubits requires in its
hashed version only (1 + o(1)) log d qubits. Moreover, the Eker˚a-H˚astad algorithm computes the
factorization of an RSA modulus N = pq of bit-size n in time polynomial in n using (32 + o(1))n
qubits, whereas our hashed version reduces this to only (12 + o(1))n qubits.
On the downside, our hashing technique requires that we obtain quantum embeddings of h ◦ f
for several h chosen uniformly at random from a family of universal hash functions. Notice that it is
of course not sufficient to compute f first, and afterwards hash the result, since this would require
qubits for representing the full range of f . It remains an interesting open problem, which classes of
functions f admit the memory-efficient computation of hashed versions, which is out of the scope
of our paper. However, we believe that our independent choices of h from a universal hash function
family is mainly a theoretical proof artefact. We conjecture that in practice a single h should still
work perfectly. Even choosing h simply as the projection of f to a single bit should work for most
functions of interest.
Our paper is organized as follows. The results for Simon’s algorithm are described in Section 3.
For didactic reasons, we study in Section 4 first the simple case of Shor’s algorithm for periods
that are a power of two. In Section 5, we generalize to any quantum circuits that fall in our period
finding class. As a consequence, in Section 5 we obtain a hashed version of Shor’s algorithm with
general periods and in Section 6 a hashed version of Eker˚a-H˚astad.
2 Preliminaries on Period Finding Algorithms
Let us first recall some quantum notation. The reversible quantum embedding of a classical function
f is defined as
Uf : |x〉 |y〉 7→ |x〉 |y + f(x)〉 .
The 1-qubit Hadamard gate realizes the mapping H1 : |x〉 7→ 1√2
∑
y∈F2(−1)xy |y〉. Its n-qubit
version is defined as the n-fold tensor product Hn =
⊗n
i=1H1. The n-qubit Quantum Fourier
Transform (QFT) realizes the mapping
QFTn : |x〉 7→
1√
2n
∑
y∈Fn2
e2pii
x
2n
y |y〉 .
Notice that QFT1 = H1.
Definition 2.1. A hash function family Ht := {h : D → {0, 1}t} is universal if for all x, y ∈ D,
x 6= y we have
Ph∈Ht [h(x) = h(y)] =
1
2t
.
Efficient instantiation of universal hash function families exist, e.g.
H1 = {hr : Fn2 → {0, 1} | r ∈ Fn2 , hr(x) =
∑n−1
i=0 xiri mod 2} is universal. It is easy to see
that strongly 2-universal hash function families as defined in [10] are universal in the sense of
Definition 2.1.
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3 Hashed-Simon
Let us briefly recall Simon’s original algorithm. Let f : Fn2 → Fn2 be periodic with period s ∈ Fn2 ,
that is f(x) = f(x + s) for all x ∈ Fn2 . We call f a Simon function if it defines a (2 : 1)-mapping,
i.e.
f(x) = f(y)⇔ (y = x) or (y = x+ s).
The use of Simon functions allows for a clean theoretical analysis, although Simon’s algorithm
works also for more general periodic functions as shown in [1,4,9]. For ease of notation, we will
restrict ourselves to Simon functions.
The Simon circuit QSimonf from Figure 1 uses n input and n output qubits for realizing the
embedding of f . It can easily be shown that in the n input qubits we measure only y ∈ Fn2 such
that y ⊥ s, i.e. ys = 0.
|0n〉 Hn
Uf
Hn
|0n〉
Fig. 1: Quantum circuit QSimonf
The Simon algorithm uses QSimonf until we have collected n − 1 linearly independent vectors,
from which we compute the unique vector s that is orthogonal to all of them using Gaussian
elimination in time O(n3).
Our Hashed-Simon (Algorithm 1) is identical to the Simon algorithm with the only difference
that QSimonf is replaced by Q
Simon
h◦f , where in each iteration we instantiate Q
Simon
h◦f with some hash
function h freshly drawn from a universal t-bit range hash function family Ht. Notice that Simon
can be considered as special case of Hashed-Simon, where we choose t = n and the identity
function h = id. This slightly abuses notation, since Hn = {id} is not universal. However, in the
following Lemma 3.1 we do not need universality. In Lemma 3.1 we show the correctness property
of Hashed-Simon that by replacing QSimonf with Q
Simon
h◦f , we still measure only y orthogonal to s.
Algorithm 1: Hashed-Simon
Input : Simon function f : Fn2 → Fn2 , universal Ht := {h : Fn2 → Ft2}.
. t = n and H = {id} for Simon.
Output: Period s of f .
1 begin
2 Set Y = ∅.
3 repeat
4 Run QSimonh◦f on |0n〉 |0t〉 for some freshly chosen h ∈R Ht.
5 Let y be the measurement of the n input qubits.
6 If y /∈ span(Y ), then include y in Y .
7 until Y contains n− 1 linear independent vectors
8 Compute {s} as Y ⊥ via Gaussian elimination.
9 return s.
10 end
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Lemma 3.1 (Orthogonality). Let f : Fn2 → Fn2 be a Simon function with period s, h : Fn2 → Ft2
and fh = h ◦ f : Fn2 → Ft2. Let us apply Qh◦f on |0n〉 |0t〉 and measure z in the last t qubits. Then
we obtain superposition∑
y∈Fn2
y⊥s
wy,z |y〉 |z〉 , where wy,z = 1
(2n · |f−1h (z)|)1/2
∑
x∈f−1h (z)
(−1)xy.
Proof. Since f is a Simon function we have f(x) = f(x+ s) and therefore fh(x) = fh(x+ s). This
implies x ∈ f−1h (z) iff x+ s ∈ f−1h (z).
An application of Qh◦f on input |0n〉 |0t〉 yields for the operations Hn ⊗ It and Ufh
|0n〉 ∣∣0t〉 Hn⊗I1→ 1
2n/2
∑
x∈Fn2
|x〉 ∣∣0t〉 Ufh→ 1
2n/2
∑
x∈Fn2
|x〉 |fh(x)〉 .
By assumption we measure z in the last t qubits. Therefore the first n qubits collapse to the uniform
superposition over all preimages f−1h (z) of z under fh. Using x ∈ f−1h (z) iff x + s ∈ f−1h (z), we
obtain in the first n qubits
1
(|f−1h (z)|)1/2
∑
x∈f−1h (z)
|x〉= 1
(|f−1h (z)|)1/2
∑
x∈f−1h (z)
1
2
(|x〉+ |x+ s〉) .
An application of Hn now yields
1
(2n · |f−1h (z)|)1/2
∑
x∈f−1h (z)
∑
y∈Fn2
1
2
(
(−1)xy + (−1)(x+s)y
)
|y〉
=
1
(2n · |f−1h (z)|)1/2
∑
x∈f−1h (z)
∑
y∈Fn2
1
2
(−1)xy (1 + (−1)sy) |y〉
=
1
(2n · |f−1h (z)|)1/2
∑
x∈f−1h (z)
∑
y∈Fn2
y⊥s
(−1)xy |y〉 .
The statement of the lemma follows.
From Lemma 3.1’s superposition∑
y∈Fn2
y⊥s
1
(2n · |f−1h (z)|)1/2
∑
x∈f−1h (z)
(−1)xy
︸ ︷︷ ︸
wy,z
|y〉 |z〉 . (1)
we see that only y ∈ Fn2 with y ⊥ s have a non-vanishing amplitude wy,z. Recall also that Lemma 3.1
contains the analysis of Simon’s original algorithm as the special case, where h is the identity
function. In this case, we know that by the definition of a Simon function |f−1h (z)| = 2 for all
z. Thus, all y ⊥ s have amplitude ± 1
2(n−1)/2 . This means that a measurement yields the uniform
distribution over all y ⊥ s.
The following lemma will be useful, when we analyse superpositions over all z.
Lemma 3.2. Let f be a Simon function. Then
∑2n
z=1wy,z = 0 for all y 6= 0.
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Proof. Fix y 6= 0n. If y 6⊥ s then all wy,z = 0 and thus the claim follows. Hence, in the following let
y ⊥ s. If z /∈ f(Fn2 ) then wy,z = 0. Therefore∑
z∈Fn2
wy,z =
∑
z∈f(Fn2 )
wy,z.
Since f is a Simon function, f is a (2:1)-mapping. Thus∑
z∈f(Fn2 )
wy,z =
1
2
∑
x∈Fn2
wy,f(x).
Using the definition of wy,z in Eq. (1) with h = id and |f−1(z)| = 2 yields
1
2
∑
x∈Fn2
wy,f(x) =
1√
2n+1
∑
x∈Fn2
(−1)xy
Since for y 6= 0 we have ∑x∈Fn2 (−1)xy = 0, the claim follows.
Let us now first develop some intuition for the amplitudes wy,z in Eq. (1) for hash functions
h : Fn2 → F2. We expect that |f−1h (z)| ≈ 2n−1. We first look at the amplitude of |y〉 = |0n〉. Since for
all x ∈ Fn2 we have (−1)xy = 1, the amplitude of |0n〉 adds up to
(
f−1h (z)
2n
) 1
2
≈ 1√
2
. Hence, we expect
to measure the zero-vector 0n with probability approximately 12 . This seems to be bad news, since
the the zero-vector is the only one orthogonal to s that does not provide any information about s.
However, we show that all y ⊥ s with y 6= 0n still appear with significant amplitude. Intuitively,∑
x∈f−1h (z)
∑
y∈Fn2
y⊥s
(−1)xy describes for y 6= 0n a random walk with |f−1h (z)| steps. Thus, this term
should contribute on expectation roughly |f−1h (z)|
1
2 to the amplitude of |y〉. So we expect for all
y ⊥ s with y 6= 0n an amplitude of 1
2n/2
. This in turn implies that conditioned on the event that
we do not measure 0n (which happens with probability roughly 12), we still obtain the uniform
distribution over all remaining y ⊥ s.
We make our intuition formal in the following lemma.
Theorem 3.1. Let H1 = {h : Fn2 → {0, 1}} be universal, and let f be a Simon function with
period s. Then we measure in Algorithm Hashed-Simon in the first n qubits any y ⊥ s, y 6= 0 with
probability 12n , where the probability is taken over the random choice of h ∈ H1.
Proof. From Lemma 3.1, we conclude that Hashed-Simon gives us a superposition∑
z∈Fn2
∑
y∈Fn2
y⊥s
wy,z |y〉 |z〉 , where wy,z = 1
(2n · |f−1h (z)|)1/2
∑
x∈f−1h (z)
(−1)xy.
In particular for z 6∈ f(Fn2 ) we have wy,z = 0. Let us first look at the special case h = id, that is
we use the original Simon algorithm with |f−1h (z)| = 2. In this case we measure any y ⊥ s with
probability 1
2n−1 . By Eq. (1), we also measure any y with probability
∑
z∈Fn2 |wy,z|
2. Since wy,z ∈ R,
we obtain |wy,z|2 = w2y,z and hence the identity∑
z∈Fn2
w2y,z =
1
2n−1
. (2)
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Now, let us look at Hashed-Simon with a single-bit output hash function h ∈ H1. Let us
denote by p = Ph∈H1 [y] the probability that we measure y in the first n qubits. Our goal is to show
that p = 12n .
For some h ∈ H1 we denote Ih,0 = {z ∈ f(Fn2 ) | h(z) = 0} and Ih,1 = {z ∈ f(Fn2 ) | h(z) = 1}.
Since Ih,0 ∪˙ Ih,1 = f(Fn2 ) and wy,z ∈ R, Hashed-Simon yields
p =
1
|H1|
∑
h∈H1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
z∈Ih,0
wy,z
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
z∈Ih,1
wy,z
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
|H1|
∑
h∈H1
 ∑
z∈Ih,0
wy,z
2 +
 ∑
z∈Ih,1
wy,z
2 . (3)
In Eq. (3) we obtain a cross-product wy,z1wy,z2 for z1 6= z2 iff z1, z2 are in the same set Ih,b,
b ∈ {0, 1}, i.e. iff h(z1) = h(z2). Using Definition 2.1 of a universal hash function family, we obtain
Ph∈H1 [h(z1) = h(z2)] = 12 for any z1 6= z2. This implies that for exactly half of all h ∈ H1 we obtain
h(z1) = h(z2).
Further using wy,z = 0 for z /∈ f(Fn2 ), we conclude that
p =
∑
z∈Fn2
w2y,z +
1
2
∑
z1 6=z2
wy,z1wy,z2 .
From Lemma 3.2 we know that 0 = 12
(∑
z∈Fn2 wy,z
)2
= 12
∑
z∈Fn2 w
2
y,z +
1
2
∑
z1 6=z2 wy,z1wy,z2 . An
application of this identity together with Eq. (2) gives us
p =
1
2
∑
z∈Fn2
w2y,z =
1
2n
,
which concludes the proof.
Theorem 3.2. Let H1 = {h : Fn2 → {0, 1}} be universal, and let f : Fn2 → Fn2 be a Simon function
with period s ∈ Fn2 . Hashed-Simon recovers s with expected 2(n + 1) applications of quantum
circuits QSimonh◦f , h ∈R H1, that use only n+ 1 qubits.
Proof. Let us define a random variable Xi, 1 ≤ i < n for the number of applications of QSimonh◦f until
Hashed-Simon finds i linearly independent y1 . . . yi. Let Ei be the event that we already have i−1
linearly independent Y = {y1, . . . , yi−1} and we measure some yi /∈ span(Y ). Define pi = P[Ei].
Using Theorem 3.1, we obtain
p1 =
2n−1 − 1
2n
.
Since |span{y1 . . . , yi−1}| = 2i−1, we obtain from Theorem 3.1 more generally
pi =
2n−1 − 2i−1
2n
.
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Clearly, Xi is geometrically distributed with parameter pi. Let X = X1 + . . . + Xn−1 denote the
number of required applications of QSimonh◦f in Hashed-Simon. Then
E[X] =
n−1∑
i=1
E[Xi] =
n−1∑
i=1
2n
2n−1 − 2i−1 =
n−1∑
i=1
2(2n−1 − 2i−1) + 2i
2n−1 − 2i−1
= 2(n− 1) +
n−1∑
i=1
2i
2n−1 − 2i−1 .
Since limn→∞
∑n−1
i=1
2i
2n−1−2i−1 ≤ 3.2134, the claim follows.
Remark 3.1. With a similar analysis as in the proof of Theorem 3.2, we obtain an upper bound of
n+ 1 for the expected number of applications of QSimonf in Simon’s original algorithm.
4 Hashed-Shor: Special Periods
Let us briefly recall Shor’s algorithm. Let f : Z → Z be periodic with period d ∈ N, i.e. d > 0 is
minimal with the property f(x) = f(x+ d) for all x ∈ Z. For ease of notation, let us first focus on
applying Shor’s algorithm for factorization. In Section 6 we will also see an application for discrete
logarithms.
Let N ∈ N be a composite n-bit number of unknown factorization, and let a be chosen uniformly
at random from Z∗N , the multiplicative group modulo N . Let us define the function f : Z → ZN ,
x 7→ ax mod N . Notice that f is periodic with d = ordN (a), since f(x + d) = ax+d = axaord(a) =
ax = f(x). It is well-known that we can compute a non-trivial factor ofN in probabilistic polynomial
time given d = ordN (a) [17]. We encode the inputs of f with q qubits.
In order to find d, Shor uses the quantum circuit QShorf from Figure 2. In Q
Shor
f we measure in
the q input qubits with high probability y that are close to some multiple of 2
q
d . The original Shor
algorithm then measures sufficiently many y’s (a constant number is sufficient) to extract d in a
classical post-process.
|0q〉 Hq
Uf
QFTq
|0n〉
Fig. 2: Quantum circuit QShorf
Our Hashed-Shor (Algorithm 2) simply replaces circuit QShorf with its hashed version Q
Shor
h◦f .
Notice that Shor is a special case of Hashed-Shor for the choice t = dlog2(N)e and Ht = {id}.
For this choiceHt is not universal, but we do not need universality in the following Lemma 4.1 about
the superposition produced by Qh◦f . From Lemma 4.1 we conclude correctness of Hashed-Shor
for any t-bit range hash function h.
Lemma 4.1. Let N ∈ N, a ∈ Z∗N with d = ordN (a) and f(x) = ax mod N . Let h : ZN → {0, 1}t.
Define Mz := {k ∈ Zd | h(ak mod N) = z}. An application of quantum circuit QShorh◦f on input
8
Algorithm 2: Hashed-Shor
Input : f : Z→ ZN , universal Ht := {h : ZN → {0, 1}t}
. t = dlog2(N)e and Ht = {id} for Shor
Output: Period d of f
1 begin
2 Set Y = ∅.
3 repeat
4 Run QShorh◦f on |0q〉 |0t〉 for some freshly chosen h ∈R Ht.
5 Let y be the measurement of the q input qubits.
6 If y 6= 0, then include y in Y .
7 until |Y | is sufficiently large.
8 Compute d from Y in a classical post-process.
9 return d
10 end
|0q〉 |0t〉 yields superposition
|Φh〉 =
2q−1∑
y=0
∑
z∈{0,1}t
1
2q
∑
k∈Mz
∑
c≥0:
cd+k<2q
e2pii
cd+k
2q
y |y〉 |z〉 . (4)
Proof. In QShorh◦f , we apply on input |0q〉 |0t〉 first the operation Hq⊗It followed by Uh◦f . This results
in superposition
1√
2q
2q−1∑
x=0
|x〉 |h(ax mod N)〉 .
Let x = cd + k with k ∈ Zd. Since ax = acd+k ≡ ak mod N , the value of f(x) depends only on
k = (x mod d). Therefore, we rewrite the above superposition as
1√
2q
∑
z∈{0,1}t
∑
k∈Mz
∑
c≥0:
cd+k<2q
|cd+ k〉 |z〉 ,
Eventually, an application of QFTq yields
|Φh〉 =
2q−1∑
y=0
∑
z∈{0,1}t
1
2q
∑
k∈Mz
∑
c≥0:
cd+k<2q
e2pii
cd+k
2q
y
︸ ︷︷ ︸
wy,z
|y〉 |z〉 .
Remark 4.1. For the choice h = id, Lemma 4.1 provides an analysis of Shor’s original quantum
circuit QShorf . This choice implies Mz = {k ∈ Zd | ak = z mod N}. Therefore, we obtain the
superposition
|Φ〉 =
2q−1∑
y=0
d−1∑
k=0
1
2q
∑
c≥0:
cd+k<2q
e2pii
cd+k
2q
y |y〉 |ak mod N〉 . (5)
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and the amplitudes of |y〉 |zk〉 with zk = ak mod N are
wy,zk =
1
2q
∑
c≥0:
cd+k<2q
e2pii
cd+k
2q
y .
For didactical reasons and ease of notation, let us look in the subsequent section at the special
case of periods d that are powers of two. In Section 5, we analyse the general d case.
4.1 Periods that are a power of two
Let d = 2r for some r ∈ N with r ≤ q. Then max{c ∈ N | cd + k < 2q} = 2qd − 1 = 2q−r − 1,
independent of k ∈ Zd. Hence, let us define m = 2qd and zk = ak mod N . Using md = 2q, this
allows us to rewrite Eq. (5) and Eq. (4) as
|Φ〉 =
2q−1∑
y=0
d−1∑
k=0
(
1√
d
· e2pii k2q y
)
·
(
1√
m · 2q
m−1∑
c=0
e2pii
cd
2q
y
)
|y〉 |zk〉 (6)
respectively for h : ZN → {0, 1} as
|Φh〉 =
2q−1∑
y=0
∑
z∈{0,1}
 1√
d
∑
k∈Mz
e2pii
k
2q
y
 ·( 1√
m · 2q
m−1∑
c=0
e2pii
cd
2q
y
)
|y〉 |z〉 . (7)
Notice that the factor
1√
m · 2q
m−1∑
c=0
e2pii
cd
2q
y
is identical in |Φ〉 and its hashed version |Φh〉. Further notice that the factor is independent of zk
and z. In the following lemma we show that for a measurement of any |y〉, where y is a multiple of
m, this factor contributes to the probability with 1d .
Lemma 4.2. Let d = 2r ≤ 2q and y = `m for some 0 ≤ ` < d. Then we measure |y〉 in either |Φ〉
or |Φh〉 from Equation (6) or (7) with probability∣∣∣∣∣ 1√m · 2q
m−1∑
c=0
e2pii
cd
2q
y
∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
d
.
Proof. Since y = `m = `2
q
d we obtain∣∣∣∣∣ 1√m · 2q
m−1∑
c=0
e2pii
cd
2q
y
∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
m · 2q
∣∣∣∣∣
m−1∑
c=0
e2piic`
∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
m2
m · 2q =
m
2q
=
1
d
.
We now show that the same common factor ensures that in both superpositions |Φ〉 and its
hashed version |Φh〉 we never measure some |y〉 where y is not a multiple of m.
Lemma 4.3. Let d = 2r ≤ 2q and y ∈ {0, . . . , 2q − 1} with m - y. Then we measure |y〉 in either
|Φ〉 or |Φh〉 from Equation (6) or (7) with probability 0.
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Proof. Let y = m`+ k with 0 < k < `. It suffices to show that
∣∣∣∑m−1c=0 e2pii cd2q y∣∣∣2 = 0. Using d2q = 1m ,
we obtain ∣∣∣∣∣
m−1∑
c=0
e2pii
cd
2q
y
∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
∣∣∣∣∣
m−1∑
c=0
e2pii
c
m
(m`+k)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
∣∣∣∣∣
m−1∑
c=0
(
e2pii
k
m
)c∣∣∣∣∣
2
= 0.
Hence, we conclude from Lemmata 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 that in both |Φ〉 and its hashed version |Φh〉
we always measure some |y〉 for which y = `m = `2qd . Assume that gcd(`, d) = 1, then we directly
read off d from y. If ` is uniformly distributed in the interval [0, d) this happens with sufficient
probability to compute d in polynomial time.
Indeed, in Shor’s original algorithm ` is uniformly distributed since the first factor in Eq. (6)
satisfies for any y
d−1∑
k=0
∣∣∣∣ 1√d · e2pii k2q y
∣∣∣∣2 = 1d
d−1∑
k=0
∣∣∣e2pii k2q y∣∣∣2 = 1
d
d−1∑
k=0
1 = 1.
Similar to the reasoning in Section 3, we show that in the case of the hashed version |Φh〉
we obtain any |y〉 with y 6= 0 with probability 12d , where the probability is taken over the random
choice of the hash function. This implies that we measure for |Φh〉 the useless y = 0 with probability
1− d−12d ≈ 12 .
Theorem 4.1. Let N ∈ N, a ∈ Z∗N with d = ordN (a) a power of two and f(x) = ax mod N . Let
H1 = {h : ZN → {0, 1}} be universal. Then we measure in Hashed-Shor in the q input qubits
any y = `m, 0 < ` < d with probability 12d , where the probability is taken over the random choice of
h ∈ H1.
Proof. Let us denote by ph = Ph∈H1 [y] the probability that we measure y in Hashed-Shor in the
q input qubits. By Lemma 4.1, Eq. (7) and Lemma 4.2 we know that for all y = `m = `2
q
d we have
ph =
1
|H1|
∑
h∈H1
∑
z∈{0,1}
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1√d
∑
k∈Mz
e2pii
k
2q
y
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
· 1
d
=
1
d2
· 1|H1|
∑
h∈H1
∑
z∈{0,1}
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
k∈Mz
e2pii
k`
d
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
.
Recall that Mz := {k ∈ Zd | h(ak mod N) = z}. Observe that for k1 6= k2 we obtain a cross-product
e2pii
k1`
d · e2pii k2`d = e2pii (k1−k2)`d iff k1, k2 are in the same set Mb, b ∈ {0, 1}, i.e. iff h(ak1 mod N) =
h(ak2 mod N). Using Definition 2.1 of a universal hash function family, we obtain Ph∈H1 [h(ak1 mod
N) = h(ak2 mod N)] = 12 for any k1 6= k2. This implies that for exactly half of all h ∈ H1 we obtain
h(ak1 mod N) = h(ak2 mod N). Therefore,
ph =
1
d2
·
d−1∑
k=0
∣∣∣e2pii k`d ∣∣∣2 + 1
2
∑
k1∈Zd
∑
k2 6=k1∈Zd
e2pii
(k1−k2)`
d
 .
Since k1 − k2 6= 0, we can rewrite as
ph =
1
d2
·
d+ d
2
∑
k∈Zd\{0}
e2pii
k`
d
 = 1
d2
·
(
d− d
2
)
=
1
2d
.
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From Theorem 4.1 we see that in the hashed version |Φh〉 we measure every y = m`, y 6= 0
with probability 12d , whereas in comparison in |Φ〉 we measure every y = m` with probability 1d . It
follows that in Eq. (7) the scaling factor
S =
∑
z∈{0,1}
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1√d
∑
k∈Mz
e2pii
k
2q
y
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
(8)
takes on expected value 12 for y = `m, 0 < ` < d taken over all h ∈ H1. Notice that S is a symmetric
function in y, i.e. S(y) = S(2q − y).
Let us look at an example to illustrate how the probabilities behave. We choose N = 51 = 3 ·17,
a = 2 and q = 12. This implies d = ordN (a) = 8 and m =
2q
d = 512. In |Φ〉 we measure some
y = m` = 512`, 0 ≤ ` < d = 8 with probability 18 each, as illustrated in Figure 3a.
Let us assume we have in Hashed-Shor M0 = {2, 3, 4, 7}. This fully specifies the scaling func-
tion S from Eq. (8). Thus, each amplitude from |Φ〉 is multiplied by S, as illustrated in Figure 3b.
0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
y
P
ro
b
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y
Shor
(
QShorf
)
1/8 line.
(a) Shor with d = 8, m = 512. The probabilities are
independent of the measurement of the output qubits
zk.
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)
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S/d.
(b) Hashed-Shor with d = 8, m = 512 and
M0 = {2, 3, 4, 7}.
Fig. 3: Probability distributions for Shor and Hashed-Shor
Theorem 4.2. Let N ∈ N, a ∈ Z∗N with d = ordN (a) a power of two and f(x) = ax mod N . Let
H1 = {h : ZN → {0, 1}} be universal, and let x be represented by q input qubits in QShorh◦f . Then
Hashed-Shor finds f ’s period d with expected 4 applications of quantum circuits QShorh◦f , h ∈R H1,
that use only q + 1 qubits.
Proof. In Shor we compute the fraction y2q =
`
d in reduced form. Since d is a power of two, this
fraction reveals d in its denominator iff ` is odd. Using Theorem 4.1, we measure y = m` with an
odd `, 0 < ` < d with probability d2 · 12d = 14 . Thus, we need on expectation 4 applications of QShorh◦f
to find f ’s period d.
Notice that we can check the validity of d via testing the identity ad
?
= 1 mod N .
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For comparison, we need in Shor’s original algorithm with the non-hashed version of f on
expectation 2 measurements until we find d.
5 Hashed Shor: Finding Periods in General
Notice that we proved in Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 4.1 that when we move to the hashed version
of our quantum circuits all probabilities to measure some y 6= 0 decrease exactly by a factor of 12
(over the random choice the hash function).
The same is true for finding arbitrary (non power of two) periods with circuit QShorh◦f . However,
this does not immediately follow from the proof of Theorem 4.1, because the proof builds on the
special form of superposition |Φh〉 from Eq. (7) that only holds if d is a power of two. Here we show
a more general result for period finding algorithms that applies for Shor’s original circuit as well
as for its Eker˚a-H˚astad variant in the subsequent section. To this end let us define a generic period
finding quantum circuit QPeriodf (see Figure 4). In Figure 4 we denote by Q1, Q2 any quantum
circuitry that acts on the q input qubits. For example, for Simon’s circuit we have Q1 = Q2 = Hq
(see Figure 1). For Shor’s circuit we have Q1 = Hq and Q2 = QFTq. In the following Theorem 5.1 we
will define explicitly a cancellation criterion that this circuitry Q1, Q2 has to fulfill. An important
feature of QPeriodf is however that we apply f only once.
|0q〉 Q1
Uf
Q2
|0n〉
Fig. 4: Quantum circuit QPeriodf
Now let us use our generic period finding circuitQPeriodf inside a generic period finding algorithm
Period that uses a certain number of measurements of QPeriodf and some classical post-processing.
If we replace in Period the circuit QPeriodf by its hashed variant Q
Period
h◦f then we call the resulting
algorithm Hashed-Period (Algorithm 3).
Algorithm 3: (Hashed-)Period
Input : f : {0, 1}q → {0, 1}n, universal Ht := {h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}t}
. H = {id} for Period.
Output: Period d of f
1 begin
2 Set Y = ∅.
3 repeat
4 Run QPeriodh◦f on |0q〉 |0t〉 for some freshly chosen h ∈R Ht.
5 Let y be the measurement of the q input qubits.
6 If y 6= 0q, then include y in Y .
7 until |Y | is sufficiently large.
8 Compute d from Y in a classical post-process.
9 return d
10 end
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The proof of the following theorem closely follows the reasoning in proof of Theorem 3.1. Here
we show that the probabilities exactly half in the hashed version if a certain cancellation criterion
(Equation (9)) is met.
Theorem 5.1. Let f : {0, 1}q → {0, 1}n and H1 = {h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}} be universal. Let QPeriodf
be a quantum circuit that on input |0q〉 |0n〉 yields superposition
|Φ〉 =
∑
y∈{0,1}q
∑
f(x)∈Im(f)
wy,f(x) |y〉 |f(x)〉 satisfying
∑
f(x)∈Im(f)
wy,f(x) = 0 for any y 6= 0. (9)
Let us denote by p(y), respectively ph(y), the probability to measure some |y〉, y 6= 0 in the q
input qubits when applying QPeriodf , respectively Q
Period
h◦f with h ∈R H1, on input |0q〉 |0n〉. Then
ph(y) =
1
2p(y).
Proof. For ease of notation let us denote z = f(x). By definition, we have p(y) =
∑
z∈Im(f) |wy,z|2.
Now let us find an expression for ph(y) when using Q
Period
h◦f . For h ∈ H1 we denote
Ih,0 = {z ∈ Im(f) | h(z) = 0} and Ih,1 = {z ∈ Im(f) | h(z) = 1}. Since Ih,0 ∪˙ Ih,1 = Im(f),
we obtain
ph(y) =
1
|H1|
∑
h∈H1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
z∈Ih,0
wy,z
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
z∈Ih,1
wy,z
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2 . (10)
In Eq. (10) we obtain a cross-product wy,z1wy,z2 for z1 6= z2 iff z1, z2 are in the same set Ih,b,
b ∈ {0, 1}, i.e. iff h(z1) = h(z2). Using Definition 2.1 of a universal hash function family, we obtain
Ph∈H[h(z1) = h(z2)] = 12 for any z1 6= z2. This implies that for exactly half of all h ∈ H we obtain
h(z1) = h(z2). We conclude that
ph(y) =
∑
z∈Im(f)
|wy,z|2 + 1
2
∑
z1 6=z2
wy,z1wy,z2 .
Our prerequisite
∑
z∈Im(f)wy,z = 0 for any y 6= 0 implies
0 =
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
z∈Im(f)
wy,z
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
2
∑
z∈Im(f)
|wy,z|2 + 1
2
∑
z1 6=z2
wy,z1wy,z2 = ph(y)−
1
2
∑
z∈Im(f)
|wy,z|2.
Together with the definition of p(y) we conclude that
ph(y) =
1
2
∑
z∈Im(f)
|wy,z|2 = 1
2
p(y).
We already showed in Lemma 3.2 that Simon’s circuit QSimonf fulfills the cancellation crite-
rion (Equation (9)) of Theorem 5.1. Thus, the statement of Theorem 3.1 directly follows from
Theorem 5.1. However, for an improved intelligibility we preferred to prove Theorem 3.1 directly.
In the following Theorem 5.2 we show that QShorf also meets the cancellation criterion. Thus,
going to the hashed version in Shor’s algorithm immediately halves all probabilities for y 6= 0.
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Theorem 5.2. On input |0q〉 |0n〉 the quantum circuit QShorf yields superposition
|Φ〉 =
∑
y∈{0,1}q
∑
f(x)∈Im(f)
wy,f(x) |y〉 |f(x)〉 satisfying
∑
f(x)∈Im(f)
wy,f(x) = 0 for any y 6= 0.
Proof. From Equation (5) we know that QShorf yields superposition
|Φ〉 =
2q−1∑
y=0
∑
f(x)∈Im(f)
wy,f(x) |y〉 |f(x)〉 with
∑
f(x)∈Im(f)
wy,f(x) =
d−1∑
k=0
1
2q
∑
c≥0:
cd+k<2q
e2pii
cd+k
2q
y .
We conclude for y 6= 0 that
∑
f(x)∈Im(f)
wy,f(x) =
d−1∑
k=0
1
2q
∑
c≥0:
cd+k<2q
e2pii
cd+k
2q
y =
2q−1∑
r=0
1
2q
e2pii
r
2q
y =
1
2q
2q−1∑
r=0
(
e2pii
y
2q
)r
= 0 .
Since by Theorem 5.1 the use of hashed versions halves all probabilities for y 6= 0, we expect
that Hashed-Period requires twice as many measurements as Period. This is more formally
shown in the following Theorem 5.3.
Theorem 5.3. Let f : {0, 1}q → {0, 1}n have period d, and let H1 = {h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}}
be universal. Assume that Period succeeds to find d with probability ρ with an expected number
of t measurements, using some QPeriodf with q + n qubits that satisfies the cancellation criterion
(Equation (9)) of Theorem 5.1. Then Hashed-Period succeeds to find d with probability ρ using
QPeriodh◦f , h ∈R H1, with only q + 1 qubits and an expected number of 2t measurements.
Proof. We first show the factor of 2 difference in the expected number of measurements. In the case
of QPeriodf we measure some y 6= 0 with probability
∑2q−1
y=1 p(y), whereas for Q
Period
h◦f we measure
y 6= 0 with half the probability ∑2q−1y=1 p(y)/2 = 12∑2q−1y=1 p(y) according to Theorem 5.1. This
implies that on expectation we need twice as many measurements.
It remains to show that Hashed-Period has the same success probability ρ as Period to
compute the period d. To this end we show that conditioned on y 6= 0, both circuits QPeriodf and
QPeriodh◦f yield an identical probability distribution for the measured |y〉 in the q input qubits.
Let p(y), respectively ph(y), be the probability that we measure |y〉 in the q input qubits using
QShorf , respectively Q
Shor
h◦f . Since Period conditions on measuring y 6= 0 we obtain in the case of
QShorf the probabilities
p(y)∑2q−1
y=1 p(y)
for any y 6= 0.
In the case QShorh◦f , we obtain using Theorem 5.1 the same probabilities
p(y)/2∑2q−1
y=1 p(y)/2
=
p(y)∑2q−1
y=1 p(y)
for any y 6= 0.
Since both probability distributions are identical, the success probability ρ is identical as well,
independent of any specific post-process for computing d.
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Since by Theorem 5.2 Shor’s circuit QShorf satisfies the cancellation criterion of Theorem 5.1,
Theorem 5.3 implies that we can implement Shor’s algorithm with q + 1 instead of q + n qubits at
the cost of only twice as many measurements. In other words, we save all but one of the output
qubits.
6 Hashed Eker˚a-H˚astad: Factoring n-bit RSA numbers with 1
2
n qubits
In 2017, Eker˚a and H˚astad [5] proposed a variant of Shor’s algorithm for computing the discrete
logarithms of x = gd in polynomial time with only (1 + o(1)) log d input qubits. The Eker˚a-H˚astad
algorithm saves input qubits in comparison to Shor’s original discrete logarithm algorithm whenever
d is significantly smaller than the group order.
An interesting application of such a small discrete logarithm algorithm is the factorization of
n-bit RSA moduli N = pq, where p, q are primes of the same bit-size. Let g ∈R Z∗N . Then ordN (g)
divides φ(N)/2 = (p− 1)(q − 1)/2 = N+12 − p+q2 . Therefore
x := g−
N+1
2 = g
p+q
2 mod N.
Hence, we obtain a discrete logarithm instance in Z∗N where the desired logarithm d =
p+q
2 is of
size only roughly n2 bits, whereas group elements have to be represented with n bits. Notice that
the knowledge of d = p+q2 together with N = pq immediately yields the factorization of N in
polynomial time.
The Eker˚a-H˚astad algorithm computes d with (12 +
1
s )n input and n outbit qubits, using a
classical post-process that takes time polynomial in n and ss. Choosing s = lognlog logn , we obtain a
polynomial time factoring algorithm with a total of (32 + o(1))n qubits.
In the following, we show that the Eker˚a-H˚astad algorithm is covered by our framework of
quantum period finding algorithms which fulfill the cancellation criterion of Equation (9) from
Theorem 5.1. Thus, by Theorem 5.3 we can save all but 1 of the n output qubits via hashing, at
the cost of only doubling the number of quantum measurements. This in turn leads to a polynomial
time factorization algorithm for n-bit RSA numbers using only (12 + o(1))n qubits. Concerning
discrete logarithms, with our hashing approach we can quantumly compute d from g and gd in
polynomial time using only (1 + o(1)) log d qubits.
Let (g, x = gd, S(G)) be a discrete logarithm instance with m = log d. Here S(G) specifies how
we compute in the group G generated by g, e.g. S(G) = N specifies that we compute modulo N in
the group G = Z∗N . Define
fg,x,S(G)(a, b) = a
x · x−b = ga−bd.
The Eker˚a-H˚astad quantum circuit QEker˚a-Ha˚stadf from Figure 5 computes on input |0m+`〉 |0`〉 |0n〉,
where ` := ms , a superposition
|Φ〉 = 1
2m+2`
2m+`−1∑
a,j=0
2`−1∑
b,k=0
e2pii(aj+2
mbk)/2m+` |j, k, fg,x,S(G)(a, b)〉 . (11)
The main step in the analysis of Eker˚a-H˚astad shows that we measure in the m+2` = (1+ 2s )m =
(1 + 2s ) log d input qubits with high probability so-called good pairs (j, k) that help us in computing
d via some lattice reduction technique.
In the following Theorem 6.1, we show that QEker˚a-Ha˚stadf satisfies our cancellation criterion
of Theorem 5.1. Thus, we conclude from Theorem 5.1 that by moving to the hashed version
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|0`+m〉 H`+m
Ufg,x,S(G)
QFTl+m
|0`〉 H` QFT`
|0n〉
Fig. 5: Quantum circuit QEker˚a-Ha˚stadf
QEker˚a-Ha˚stadh◦f we lower the probabilities of measuring good (j, k) only by a factor of
1
2 (averaged
over all hash functions).
Theorem 6.1. Let (g, x, S(G)) be a discrete logarithm instance and fg,x,S(G)(a, b) = g
ax−b. On
input |02`+m〉 |0n〉 the quantum circuit QEker˚a-Ha˚stadf yields superposition
|Φ〉 =
∑
y∈{0,1}m+2`
∑
f(x)∈Im(f)
wy,f(x) |y〉 |f(x)〉 satisfying
∑
f(x)∈Im(f)
wy,f(x) = 0 for any y 6= 0 .
Proof. From Eq. (11) with y = (j, k) we know that QEker˚a-Ha˚stadf yields superposition
|Φ〉 =
2m+`−1∑
j=0
2m+`−1∑
k=0
∑
f(x)∈Im(f)
w(j,k),f(x) |j, k〉 |f(x)〉 with
∑
f(x)∈Im(f)
w(j,k),f(x) =
1
2m+2`
2m+`−1∑
a=0
2`−1∑
b=0
e2pii(aj+2
mbk)/2m+` .
Hence for y 6= 0 we obtain
∑
f(x)∈Im(f)
w(j,k),f(x) =
1
2m+2`
2m+`−1∑
a=0
e2piiaj/2
m+`
 ·
2`−1∑
b=0
e2piibk/2
`

=
1
2m+2`
2m+`−1∑
a=0
(
e2piij/2
m+`
)a ·
2`−1∑
b=0
(
e2piik/2
l
)b .
Since by prerequisite (j, k) 6= (0, 0) ∈ Z2m+` × Z2` , we have j 6= 0 mod 2m+` or k 6= 0 mod 2`. This
implies that at least one of the factors is identical 0.
By Theorem 5.3, replacing in the Eker˚a-Hast˚ad algorithm the quantum circuit QEker˚a-Ha˚stadf
by single output bit circuits QEker˚a-Ha˚stadh◦f comes at the cost of only twice the number of measure-
ments. Since the Eker˚a-Hast˚ad algorithm finds discrete logarithms d in polynomial time using only
m+ 2` = (1 + o(1)) log d input qubits, we obtain from Theorem 5.3 the following corollary.
Corollary 6.1. Eker˚a-Hast˚ad’s Shor variant admits a hashed version that
1. computes discrete logarithms d from g, gd in polynomial time using (1 + o(1)) log d qubits,
2. factors n-bit RSA numbers in time polynomial in n using (12 + o(1))n qubits.
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